The Japanese perceptions of Hawai'i 
Introduction
Ever since the emergence of the multimedia "healing boom" (iyashi būmu) in the 1990s, both domestic and international targets for Japanese tourists have been defined by their potential to bestow "healing" (iyashi) and "happiness" (kōfuku), and some of those early destinations have even become targets of migration today. The "Emigrating to Okinawa boom" (Okinawa ijū būmu) , which occurred in the last decade (2001Ϫ2009), is in fact still promoted in the media by linking migration and traveling to the term iyashi. The tourist's imagination and the visualization of travel destinations in the media are always inseparably linked (Crouch et al. 2005: 1Ϫ9) , 1 and this also implies that a particular "tourist gaze" on a destination always contains the notion of collective images and historical backgrounds (Urry 1990: 1) . However, against this backdrop, the questions arise of how the Japanese media constructed an uchinā identity through the Okinawa boom, 2 who the main agents of this (conscious or unconscious) "neo-imperially gazing" boom were, 3, 4 and how the mainland Japanese "gaze" has shaped these islands, or, in Gerald Figal's (2008: 86) words, "the commodifica-tion of the islands [Okinawa] for tourist consumption, raising questions of autonomy and authenticity".
To answer these questions, Section 2 of this paper will analyze possible socioeconomic reasons for the Okinawa boom by focusing on Japanese sociocultural issues. It will be hypothesized that the socioeconomic disaster of the 1990s and the "healing boom" (iyashi būmu) were the strongest forces that led to the multimedia Okinawa boom. Section 3 will examine official data from the prefecture of Okinawa on economic and tourism development, and compare them with the impact of tourism on tourist locations such as Hawai'i, not only because Okinawa (like other colonized islands) is located in the Pacific framework (Shigematsu and Camacho 2010: xviϪxxxiv), but also because both island chains share a long history of cultural exchange, and Okinawa still cultivates a Hawai'i-esque tropical paradise image (Figal 2008: 83Ϫ86, 93Ϫ94) . Section 4 will present a theoretical framework based on the theories of Ōtsuka Eiji and postcolonial theory to gain a precise understanding of the "neo-imperial gaze", followed by an analysis of "neo-imperial gazes" in the NHK teledrama Churasan 'Beautiful' and magazines that focused on Okinawa between 2004 and . Section 5 will scrutinize Yoshimoto Banana (*1964), a contemporary quasi-"lifestyle advisor" (Gebhardt 2010) , and especially her travel diary Nankurunaku, nai ('What Will Be, Will Not Be'), raising the question of whether Yoshimoto's "orientalisms" are representative of the neo-imperial gaze found in Okinawa boom media and the ambivalent "narratives" they create, that is, whether Yoshimoto and her writings can be seen as "neo-imperial" agents that popularize existing "Okinawa-isms" even further.
Finally, it will be argued that most "narratives" produced by Okinawans themselves fluctuate between the dualistic poles of hegemonic mimicry and counter-imperialistic ambivalence, and that their voices are still largely ignored (Spivak 2008 (Spivak [1988 ).
Apart from the individual motivation of travel, tourism and its primarily visual media can function as agents of political, economic, and social oppression, fueled not only by publicly powerful "neo-imperial" agents and a powerful global tourism industry but also due to the US military's Pacific security politics, in which Okinawa, Guam, and Hawai'i are strategically important locations. The impact of mass tourism and its stereotypical, interchangeable "tourist gaze", especially toward these postcolonial minorities of the Pacific, becomes a "neo-imperial gaze" due to the fact that historical traumata and political realities are obscured and replaced by the capitalist commodity of "healing" and stereotypical narratives of "island paradises".
Sociocultural emergencies and the Okinawa boom
The cultural basis on which the Okinawa boom was constructed and sociocultural needs satisfied by postmodern Okinawa myths have to be considered. The Ryūkyū Islands have been well researched anthropologically and historically, but Okinawa's popular media, the Okinawa boom, and agents of colonial oppression in particular are still mostly overlooked. Only the Japanese sociologist Tada Osamu and the US American Okinawa specialist Gerald Figal have questioned the connection of the Okinawan tourism boom and its production of a distorted Okinawan identity.
The feeling of natsukashisa (i.e., 'dearness' or 'good old'-ness) is frequently used in the media in connection with the Okinawa boom when referring to the communal structures of villages or families that are, in comparison to mainland Japanese "contemporary" social conditions, portrayed as still intact. Hein (2010: 183) states that "Okinawa is thus being functionalized for Japan's interests, whereas the basic tenor is one of nostalgia (natsukashisa)", an emotionally charged perspective that is also reflected in mainland Japan's furusato tourism, 5 in which the slogan natsukashisa is also used as a general attribution (see, e.g., Graburn 2009 or Ivy 1995 . However, the visualizations and depictions of Okinawa in mass tourism publications show more points in common with other outbound island destinations such as Hawai'i and Guam, whereas inbound tourism campaigns stress entirely different visual features. Okinawa is a place persistently portrayed as "the other" Japan and, considering the "healing boom" (iyashi būmu) that started in the mid-1990s (Roquet 2009: 88) , Okinawa is functionalized as a tropical island paradise such as Hawai'i or Bali.
The word iyashi 'healing', which refers to both physical and psychological healing, has been incorporated into a vast number of products and sales promotions after the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy. 6 Especially the younger generation (the so-called rosu jene 'lost generation') started to feel anxiety and stress over growing economic and social uncertainties, employment scarcity (shūshoku hyōgaki), and emerging social disparities (kakusa shakai) (Brinton 2011: 166Ϫ188) . All these factors resulted in a rapidly growing demand for relaxation and healing. Gebhardt (2004: 326) sees the roots of the healing boom in the appearance of the New Age and spirituality boom in the Japanese media of the 1970s: "'Healing' is in various aspects a central moment of Japanese contemporary culture which found great response in the 1970s while western esoteric teachings and practices were adopted". The term iyashi was even expanded in meaning, and today includes people, labeled as iyashi-kei 'healing-type', who have a "serene and tranquil aura" and make everyone they come across "forget their plights" and "feel relaxed". Authors such as Yoshimoto Banana and much of her writing are labeled iyashi-kei since "coping with life problems, healing and solace " (2004: 331) are central emotional elements in it.
The general driving force for the need of healing and the resulting motivation to travel (or even to migrate) to foreign countries could be summed up in the phrase "Nihon wa mō dame" ('Japan is already hopeless'), frequently used by younger Japanese people, as well as in telecasts, magazines, on Internet blogs, and in novels since the end of the 1990s. It seems as if parts of the healing boom pick up fragments of the homogeneity illusions found in Nihonjinron discourse (Befu 2001; Morris-Suzuki 1998: 110Ϫ160) and turn them into their opposites: Japan as a whole is marked as "hopeless" and happiness can only be found outside of the national compound. One fictional example for this negative thinking toward Japan is the novel Metabora 'Metabola' written by Kirino Natsuo (*1951), a leading figure of the Japanese lowclass literature (purekariāto bungaku) movement. Kirino constructs Okinawa as a "last resort" and migration destination for people willing to leave "hopeless Japan", but she overturns this idea by showing young people who find neither iyashi nor kōfuku 'happiness' in their self-chosen exotic exile (Kirino 2007) . It seems to be part of the Japanese "collective memory" that Okinawa is not Japan. Nevertheless, Okinawa is an easily approachable exotic paradise, because there is no language barrier (e.g., Figal 2008: 97) .
The "father" of the Japanese folklore studies (minzokugaku), Yanagita Kunio, created the "southern theory" that has entered the curricula of universities (Yanagita 2010 (Yanagita [1961 ; Beillevaire 1999) . His ennoblement of Okinawan culture as Japan's proto-culture marks the first positive turning point of the Okinawan image in Japan. Since the colonial annexation of Okinawa in the Meiji period (1868Ϫ1912) and the cultural oppression that followed, summed up in the term Ryūkyū shobun ('the abolishment of everything Ryūkyūan'), 7 the Okinawans were transformed to underprivileged subaltern subjects in the Japanese empire. 8 Yanagita and the early folklore studies sought to create an "invented Japanese cultural tradition" where Okinawa would have functioned as the "mother" of mainland Japan. In this Nihonjinron-esque theory, Okinawa was integrated into the hegemonic and homogeneous cultural sphere. In the 1990s, however, Yanagita's "southern theory" was gradually replaced by the "Dual Structure Model" of Hanihara Kazurō. His theory points out that the Okinawan people are descendants of the Jōmon people, and that the Yayoi migrants are the ancestors of the modern mainland Japanese (Hanihara 1991) .
Folklore studies and their theories became publicly popular in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, and authors such as Nakagami Kenji started to research about the myths of rural areas of Japan, incorporating them in his novels. As a result, inbound tourism to rural destinations began to flourish and the JR tourism campaign "Discover Japan" set the stage for many tourist campaigns to follow (Ivy 1995: 29Ϫ95) .
Examining the connection of tourism and images of Okinawa in mainland Japan, Tada (2008: 98Ϫ105) states that Okinawa, alongside having been an object of anthropological interest, saw a first traveling boom to war memorials (triggered also by the novel Himeyuri no tō ['Tower of the Star Lilies'] at the beginning of the 1950s and its film adaptation) set in the 1960s. The negative image of Okinawa thus changed from "the islands of tragedies" to "the islands of war memory tours" and an economic pre-reversion boom can be noticed. After 1972, many people decided to travel to this "new" old prefecture of Japan, marking the first phase of growing mass tourist interest. The first tourist resorts were built by mainland Japanese hotel chains in response to the so-called shinkon ryokō būmu ('honeymoon tourism boom'). In the late 1980s and 1990s, Okinawan music and especially Okinawan pop music experienced growing popularity. Okinawa became a brand of its own with an image that had switched from negative war memories and US military bases to the stereotyped or, as Tada (2008: 152Ϫ156) puts it, "mukokuseki" ('stateless') affirmation of resorts and marine sports, an image fostered in the 1980s by tourist campaigns and the need to compete with other tropical island destinations such as Guam, Saipan, and Tahiti. Tada (2008: 152) sums up the physical shaping of the "tropical Okinawa brand" in two slogans: "Globalizing the Okinawa image" and "Changing Okinawa into a 'Sea' theme park".
A highly detailed portrayal of how Okinawa changed itself florally and physically into a Hawai'i-like southern tropical resort island is provided by Figal. Arguing that war memorial tourism, heritage tourism, and tropical island tourism amalgamated on Okinawa (Figal 2008: 104Ϫ107) , he locates the roots of this change back in the 1950s and quotes various officials and tourism experts who advised Okinawans to follow Hawai'ian examples by importing hibiscus plants and palm trees in order to customize the Okinawan natural landscape to meet tourist preferences (2008: 93Ϫ95) . In a similar vein, Tada (2008: 156) identified a growing interest in the Japanese public consciousness throughout the 1990s, when a second switch to keywords such as "nature", "history", and "Okinawa pop" became visible. In the latter half of the 1990s, the tourist image of Okinawa became part of Okinawa's indigenous identity, but the ongoing conflicts over US military bases, crimes committed by US servicemen (e.g., the rape incidents in 1995 and 2002), and vari- The peak of the Okinawa boom commenced in 2001 after the airing of the NHK teledrama Churasan, a series that unleashed an avalanche of follow-ups in various media formats. Repeatedly shown images in Churasan became famous archetypes by which Okinawa is still identified today. These "Okinawa-isms" include awamori 'millet liquor', local cuisine and vegetables such as goya 'bitter gourd', sanshin (an older version of the Shamisen) music accompanied by traditional Okinawan songs, white beaches, coral reefs, the local tropical vegetation, American bars and street names, hibiscus flowers, the wise and spiritually versed Okinawa obā ('Okinawa granny'), "traditional" festivals such as Hārii (dragon boat rowing festival in May) and Eisā (a traditional festival with drum dancers held in July), Okinawan folk beliefs and mythi-cal figures such as the Kijimunā (a red-haired goblin of Okinawan mythology) and the Shiisā (a lion-like creature from Okinawan mythology that wards off evil), traditional architecture such as ishigaki (stonemade flood walls in villages), classical family houses, and the re-built Shuri Castle in the capital Naha, as well as traditional costumes such as bingata kimono (kimonos dyed mainly in deep red and yellow).
Okinawa thus became a mass tourism spot, and Tanaka (2003 Tanaka ( [2002 : 430Ϫ431) argues that classical Okinawan culture became nothing more than fashionable merchandise to obscure the horrific colonial thralldom, the total devastation of the islands in WWII, the occupational rule and the sex trade until 1972, as well as the present problems with US military facilities (e.g., the still-debated Futenma relocation problem) and high unemployment rates.
The extensive replication and promotion of stereotypical images/ commodities of Okinawa can be seen as a form of "neo-imperial agency", because negative images are left unstated. When comparing the Okinawa image with the tourist brand of Hawai'i (the "mother" of all postwar tropical paradise illusions) and its "Hawai'ianisms", it becomes clear not only that stereotyping is a common process when mass tourism sets in (Urry 1990: 56Ϫ65) and that most island destinations are economically generalized and merchandised in similar ways (Roberts and Lewis-Cameron 2010: 1Ϫ10), but that this is precisely the technique of interchangeable promotion that Tada (2008: 156) calls "stateless" (mukokuseki).
Socioeconomic development and tourism in Okinawa and Hawai'i
The main triggers for the Okinawa boom are the socioeconomic changes in Japan since the beginning of the 1990s. Strikingly, the phenomenon of tourist media stressing the relaxed way of life on Okinawa and its non-Japanese atmosphere can also be perceived in the hasslefree surfer image of Hawai'i, which is an important stereotype of the tourist Hawai'i brand (Lawler 2008: 8Ϫ27) . In the case of both island chains, the major shift from "second class citizens who need to be civilized" to a hyper-affirmation of otherness is typical of postcolonial dualistic psychology.
Describing the pre-and postwar era in East Asia and the Pacific, Shigematsu and Camacho (2010: xvi) argue that " [t] he regions now called Asia and Pacific Islands share a history of colonial rule by Japan and the United States" and conclude that, while the United States saw itself persistently as the "liberator" from Japanese colonial rule after WWII, in reality it pushed forward its own neo-imperial and militarystrategic agenda in the Pacific. Thus, the Japanese colonizers where replaced by US military rule and bases, segregation continued through "white rule", and the indigenous nations of Guam, Okinawa, and Korea, for example, have never had the chance to decolonize entirely (2010: xviiϪxxxiii).
The two island kingdoms of Hawai'i and Okinawa thus share the fate of having been forcefully integrated into militarily powerful "empires" and suffered from discrimination as colonized minorities until hegemonic tourism started to transfigure the negative images of the former kingdoms into hyper-affirmed "exotic heterotopias". Hawai'i became the 50th state of the United States in 1959, although the islands had been occupied by the United States since the overthrow of queen Lili'uokalani in 1893 (Silva 2004: 122Ϫ135) ; the Ryūkyū kingdom and its royal dynasty on the island of Okinawa had suffered a similar fate 14 years earlier in 1879 (Kerr 2000 (Kerr [1958 : 381).
Moreover, cultural exchange between the two island chains has long been vital, due in part also to the fifth-and sixth-generation Okinawan community that lives on the islands of Hawai'i (approximately 50,000 people as of today). The first Okinawan settlers came to Hawai'i at the beginning of the twentieth century to escape the economic depression and colonial oppression on Okinawa (Kimura 2009 (Kimura [1981 : 57), and throughout WWI and WWII, countless Okinawans migrated to Hawai'i or went back to Okinawa. During the US occupation of Okinawa, Okinawan leaders from Hawai'i were invited to visit Okinawa on goodwill missions each year (Sakihara 2009 (Sakihara [1981 : 120), and an Okinawa Festival is celebrated annually on Hawai'i, while the Hawai'i United Okinawa Association in Waipahu promotes various cultural exchanges with Okinawa directly.
Today, both island chains host an enormous number of US military servicemen, alongside US military bases, military facilities, and army training grounds, all taking up more than 18% of the main island of Okinawa (Katsukata-Inafuku and Maetakenishi 2010: 346) , and more than 20% of the Hawai'ian islands are under the direct control of the US military (US Army 2012).
However, there are also significant differences between Okinawa and Hawai'i, apart from the language. Okinawan people in particular have a vital history of mass demonstrations against the US military presence (see, e.g., Vogt 2003), in part due to the incidents of rape committed by US servicemen in 1995 and 2001, as well as a US helicopter that crashed into the administrative building of the Okinawa International University in 2004 (see Figure 1) .
Furthermore, while the number of inhabitants living on the Ryūkyū Island chain (1.43 million people) has been quite stable for twenty years (with just a slight increase presumably due to people migrating to Okinawa from outside the prefecture) and consists mostly of native Okinawans, the majority of the inhabitants on Hawai'i (1.36 million in total) are not native Hawai'ians but descendants of migrants from East Asia (38.6%) and Haole 'white people' (22.7%); only 10% of people in Hawai'i are actually native Hawai'ians or descendants of other Pacific people.
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Against this backdrop, the so-called Okinawa ijū būmu ('migration to Okinawa boom') was a phenomena fostered through the commercialization of construction companies and the tourist industry. In fact, it was not only younger people who tried a relaxed and permanent life on the islands; Okinawa even became a target for retirement migration (see, e.g., Godzik 2008: 155Ϫ158). Today, however, it appears that the migration boom is already past its peak. In 2010, the Asahi Shimbun featured an article with the title "Okinawan tourism at its turning point: Tourism reached its peak and the resort bubble exploded", showing pictures of abandoned construction sites on Sesokojima Island and Ginowan City, and stating that just one quarter of all ongoing hotel construction will be finished (Asahi Shimbun 11 August 2010). The two self-proclaimed "fathers" of the mainland Japanese Okinawa boom, Nakamura Kiyoshi (*1958) and Shimokawa Yūji (*1954), published a book in 2011 that shows another result of this movement: In their introduction, Shimokawa describes a car ride with an Okinawan friend on Ishigaki Island. As they passed by newly erected but completely untenanted apartment buildings, the driver accused him and all the other business people from mainland Japan (hondo no gyōsha), saying that it was their fault that those houses had been built and that the people on Ishigaki would not be able to pay back their loans, now that the Okinawa boom was over (Shimokawa and Nakamura 2011: 9) . Figure 2 shows that the number of tourists coming to Hawai'i has been quite stable since 1989, fluctuating between 6 to 7 million visitors, and that it peaked in 2006 with 7.52 million arrivals. Mass tourism on Okinawa, on the other hand, grew steadily from the end of the 1970s (initiated by the mainland honeymoon tourism) until 1994 and peaked in 2008 with 5.93 million arrivals, before slightly declining again. The small peak in 1975 reflects the International Ocean Exposition (Okinawa kokusai kaiyō hakurankai), which took place on the main island in that year. Since 1995, the year of the Kobe earthquake and the Aum sarin attack on the Tokyo Subway, the number of tourists rose from 3.37 million to 4.62 million in 1999, and increased even further after the airing of the NHK teledrama Churasan in 2001.
Okinawa is highly dependent on domestic tourism, especially from mainland Japan, whereas the number of international visitors is small (only 3% to 5%), a fact that is quite surprising since its capital Naha Hawai'i, 1971Ϫ2010 (in 10,000s) . Hawai'i, 1971Ϫ2010 (in 10,000s) . is closer to Taiwan, Korea, and even Shanghai than to Osaka or Tokyo where most tourist visitors come from.
The number of visitors to Hawai'i fluctuates (see Figure 3) , although it is quite stable, notwithstanding the dip in domestic visitors in the mid-1990s. In fact, the missing number of visitors was compensated for by a rising number of international visitors, and since 2001 around two million international visitors (around 30% of the total number) are coming to the islands of Hawai'i, a difference of more than 20% compared to Okinawa.
Moreover, the general unemployment rate in Okinawa was 6.6% in 2010, representing a drop of about 1.5 percentage points since 1990. In mainland Japan, the number of people unemployed rose from 2.5% in 1990 to reach 5.6% as of today, a trend that is due to economic problems and which shows that the job market in Okinawa has stabilized, although unemployment is still higher than in mainland Japan. Hawai'i too has an unemployment rate of 6.6%, but this figure is 3 percentage points lower than in the rest of the United States. Similarly, the median annual household income in Okinawa rose from 2,699,000 yen in 1997 to 3,536,746 yen in 2010, whereas the median household income per year in mainland Japan rose from 4,673,000 yen to 5,475,000 yen, that is, a difference of more than 1,900,000 yen per year in 2010, which implies that Okinawa is still one of the poorer prefectures in Japan. And compared to Okinawa, in 2010, the situation on Hawai'i was again different: The median household income was 63,741 dollars, that is 13,000 dollars higher than the median household income in the United States as a whole. 10 These numbers show that the tourism industry has created many job opportunities on Okinawa; however, salaries are still low and people are mostly working in the service sector. As Urry (1990: 57Ϫ65) has pointed out, the inhabitants of many tourist destinations (especially in newly industrialized countries or regions) are "serving" rather than "creating businesses" Ϫ a fact that seems to have changed in the case of Hawai'i but which still applies to Okinawa. Although tourism has had a positive effect on the economic situation, the prefecture is still at the bottom of the Japanese economy. And considering the bursting of the construction boom bubble, the question has to be raised of whether this is the beginning of a crisis. In comparison to government funded domestic travel campaigns for rural revitalization or furusato tourism in mainland Japan, the impact of tourism on the local economy in Okinawa was small (Graburn 2009; Ivy 1995: 29Ϫ65) . The Okinawa boom was not a government scheme to promote the prefecture, and apart from mandatory financial support for the prefecture, there has never been any government-funded cash flow, for example, as special financial support for business start-ups in the tourist sector. The impact of tourism, thus, was not as huge as the Okinawans might have hoped for.
Finally, considering the political gaging and nobbling of the Okinawans in the ongoing debate over the relocation of the US airbase at Futenma, the two island chains also share a common history regarding the continuing presence of colonizers. Okinawa, which was ruled by the United States for 25 years, is pragmatically still considered a huge military harbor and airfield close to China. The promised removal of the US military bases by the Japanese government was one reason (beside numerous cases of rape, murder, and violent felony committed by US servicemen) for the brutal Koza uprising in 1970 that paved the way for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.
11 But a comparison of maps showing the military camps and their reserved areas reveals that no significant reduction took place (Katsukata-Inafuku and Maetakenishi 2010: 339Ϫ347).
Against the backdrop of a collapsed construction bubble and the previous destruction of nature to gain construction sites, the slight decline of visitors in the 1990s, the comparatively low median household income, and the presence of US military facilities, one should also remember the words of Tanaka again: The media are converting indigenous culture into merchandise, and the inhabitants have no choice other than to produce and sell it (Tanaka 2003 (Tanaka [2002 : 431). However, as Figal (2008: 104) states: "Alongside its sun, sea, and Ryukyuan landmarks, Okinawa's war memori als and US military facilities complete the outsider image of Okinawa. They are arguably part of its 'heritage' and definitely part of its tourist interest".
Escaping social anxiety or amplifying "neo-imperial" power?
Hegemonic affirmation results in indigenous self-confidence, but it makes the Okinawans forget about the fact that they are economically dependent on Japanese tourists, since the erected Okinawan "free trade zone" is nothing more than a half-hearted compromise lacking any positive economic impact (see, e.g., Rothacher 2007: 248Ϫ253). The conscious or unconscious agenda behind the multimedia Okinawa boom cannot be denied. It is a form of "neo-colonial" oppression through the "soft power" of a culturally stereotyping "neo-imperial gaze" of Japanese tourists.
Pratt described the "colonial gaze" in her groundbreaking monograph Imperial Eyes, taking as examples meticulously documented encounters with "primitive people" written by early British and Hispanic scientists and anthropologists who traveled to the New World and explored the "savages" they found by "gazing upon" them from within their white colonial framework, unable to step outside this discriminative perspective (Pratt 1992) . This "gaze" has much in common with Japanese tourists "gazing upon" the relaxing beauty of Okinawa: They want to find refuge in a temporary utopian space that is linguistically easily accessible, because after more than 100 years of Japanese school system, Ryūkyūan (the indigenous language of Okinawa) became an endangered language spoken today mostly by elderly people. The machinery of capitalist tourism infuses the market with appealing propaganda of this "paradise" and creates "narratives" that can be consumed easily, due to their interchangeable "mukokuseki" 'stateless' character (Tada 2008: 156) and because they reactivate "primal phantasies" (Bhabha 2004 (Bhabha [1994 : 107). Bhabha (2004 Bhabha ( [1994 : 107) also argues that the "fetish or stereotype gives access to an 'identity' which is […] a form of multiple and contradictory belief in its recognition of difference and disavowal […] .
[T]he fetishism is also the scene of […] the subject's desire for a pure origin that is always threatened by its division". Actually, the media already crystallized the Okinawan identity as stereotypes or "fetishes" that create a stage for something Bhabha calls "pure origin". The different powers and discourses creating the image of Okinawa are reflected in the way a colonizer or a tourist "gazes upon" a territory: They are unable to leave their cultural framework and only perceive the "narratives" the media has already staged and implanted into their (subconscious) collective memory.
The reaction on the side of the Okinawans can be translated as "postcolonial self-orientalization" (Said 2004 (Said [1978 : 2Ϫ7) or in this case: "self-okinawanization". To quote Tanaka (2003 Tanaka ( [2002 : 423) again: "In all of these [artificial beaches, golf courses, palm trees, harbors, etc.], the signs of Okinawan-ness are arranged in a certain way such that the sceneries appear to be 'natural', even to the islanders. Now it seems that the whole of Okinawa […] has become one big theme park". The Japanese visitors' "gaze" is not just a shallow leisure-time "tourist gaze". Against the background of postcolonial and historic amnesia, this "gaze" becomes an agent of neo-imperial oppression, a "neo-imperial gaze" that only wishes to settle upon desired illusions, or to say it with Ōtsuka (2002 [1989] : 20), "the narrative someone wants to consume" (shōhi shitai monogatari).
Analyzing print and visual media of the Okinawa boom from this perspective, the "Okinawa narratives" (Okinawa monogatari) presented in these media appear in a new light. Churasan and its three sequels aired as serial teledramas (renzoku terebi shōsetsu) in 2001, 2003, 2004 , and 2007 on NHK. The first season consisted of 156 episodes with a duration of 15 minutes per episode that aired on workdays in the morning, and was targeted at housewives, children, and seniors. The main heroine Eri, who was born on the day of the reversion of Okinawa on 15 May 1975, is an optimistic, cheerful, and vivid young woman from Okinawa who wants to become a nurse in Tokyo. Since her move from Okinawa to the nostalgically furnished apartment com-plex Ippūkan ('eccentric mansion') in Tokyo in episode 30, she is constantly contrasted with the other hopeless residents. Comforting the people around her, she is described as "pure" and people are reminded of their "innocent past", because they see their younger "unspoiled" selves reflected in her. She is a typical iyashi-kei 'healing-type' character and represents all stereotyped characteristics of Okinawan "otherness" such as kindness and gentleness. When the story switches to Eri's family on Okinawa, all Okinawan characters, especially the Obā 'grandmother', versed in Okinawa traditions, indigenous beliefs, and Ryūkyūan language, are transformed into physical representations of things that got lost in mainland Japan, but which still exist in Okinawa. All this evokes the feeling of natsukashisa.
The teledrama got mostly positive criticism even in Okinawa, and the Okinawa-isms in the series were not questioned. On the contrary, many Okinawans started to identify themselves with the characters (Tanaka 2003 (Tanaka [2002 : 427). The only negative criticism resulted from not mentioning the US military presence or war memories.
However, throughout Churasan, one is constantly reminded of Yanagita Kunio (2010 Kunio ( [1961 ) and his classical folklore studies that "gazed upon" Okinawa as a remnant of "good old" Yamato. In fact, Churasan reads like an allegory of the post-reversion years, exemplified by the direction of Eri's life, her exoticization and unification with the "power center" Japan, as she moves from Kohama Island, which is next to Ishigaki, to Okinawa and then to Tokyo, becomes a nurse after failing the entrance exams of Japanese universities, marries a Japanese doctor, bears his child, and after the child gets sick, moves back to Kohama Island with her family. Tanaka (2003 Tanaka ( [2002 : 426) contemplates that, since Churasan aired, the main stereotypes that characterized Okinawa in mainland Japan switched from "nature" and "indigenous culture" to the emotional commodities of "gentleness" (yasashisa) and "comfort" (iyashisa), and that this shift made the following tourist boom possible. Moreover, Tada (2008: 269) sees the influence of Churasan much more in the growing nationwide interest in the diversity of Okinawan "everyday life" (nichijō-ka) and in the final change from a negative to a positive image in public consciousness, adding that " [c] Thus, Churasan added a more specific Okinawan touch of daily life to the existing Okinawa-isms, extending the exotic paradise narratives of tourist campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. But it also gave birth to Okinawa-isms that inspired a multitude of replicas in the Okinawa boom so that the mukokuseki 'stateless' character of the 1980s tourist resort campaigns escalated again, especially in the visual depiction of Okinawa (2008: 156) .
Movies after Churasan reveal many more details about Okinawan history and problematic issues, but the persistent stressing of healing (iyashi), gentleness (yasashisa), and an alternate relaxed lifestyle are still the predominant narratives. These movies are very easy-going, the mood is permanently optimistic, and the female protagonist in Hoteru haibisukasu ('Hotel Hibiscus') by Japanese director Nakae Yūji (2002), for example, too shows a nearly pathological joie de vivre that consumers can easily interpret as being characteristic of Okinawa in general.
Ko Mika (2010: 26) calls the depiction of minorities in movies such as Churasan and Hoteru haibisukasu "cosmetic multiculturalism", because "outlandish" culture is staged in the middle of Japan, but the way in which this "otherness" is celebrated and exaggeratedly affirmed shows that this particular culture/minority is not integrated into the Japanese cultural hegemony; that is, they are not accepted as a part of "homogeneous" Japanese society.
The "Okinawa narrative" in Churasan barely refers to reality, presents a typical "neo-imperial gaze" and enforces an Okinawa-esque simulacrum also used by magazines focusing on Okinawa such as Okinawa Sutairu ('Okinawa Style') and Gekkan Hands ('Monthly Hands') that appeared monthly or quarterly between 2004 and 2009. 12 The Ryūkyū Shimpō, one of the two big Okinawan newspapers, wrote in 2009 that those magazines focusing on Okinawan culture were already mostly suspended, labeling these magazines with the following key words: "the trend to migrate to Okinawa (Okinawa ijū) These magazines continually repeat the same Okinawa-esque images of a "beautifully different Japan" where everybody can find healing. It can be assumed that those regularly published images had a strong influence on the visual perception of Okinawa and that they deepened the "neo-imperial amnesia" by blurring reality with tropical scenery and relaxed lifestyles. The apparent agenda of raising sales by employing Okinawan stereotypes is quite obvious. In capitalist societies, neither everything can be excused by saying "it was just a commercial", nor can the blame be put on the industry exclusively. The interconnection of socially constructed needs, media, and companies has promoted conscious or unconscious "neo-imperial" agency.
Yoshimoto Banana: healing through exotic "otherness"?
Yoshimoto Banana's early works such as Kitchin ('Kitchen'), Mūnraito shadou ('Moonlight Shadow'), and Tsugumi ('Goodbye Tsugumi') were highly praised even outside of Japan and her name ranked alongside Murakami Haruki's. However, it became awkwardly quiet around her since the millennium and her last publication translated into English was Mizūmi ('The Lake'), first published in 2005. One of the predominant motifs of her recent publications became the life of couples, motherhood, lifestyle, and foremost healing (iyashi) that can be acquired in different forms in countries outside of Japan (Yoshimoto 2010b) .
Spirituality was a mostly overlooked plot device of Yoshimoto, as Sherif (1999) detected. Although authors such as Ōe Kenzaburo and Nakagami Kenji had already experimented with spiritual topics since the New Age wave in the 1970s, exemplary works of Yoshimoto in this field are her short story on the relationship between a female protagonist and an esoteric charm maker called Akira in Chi to mizu 'Blood and Water' from 1991 (published in the short story collection Tokage 'Lizard'), and the short story Marika no sofa 'Marika's sofa' (1997), which was published together with her Bari yume nikki 'Dream Diary from Bali'. The latter is one of her first novels in which the connection between Yoshimoto's own interests in traveling and spirituality become clear. The story focuses on a female character called Marika who, due to sexual abuse and torture in her childhood, suffers from a multiple personality disorder. One of her manifestations calls himself Orange. The second accompanying protagonist, Junko, is obsessed with the soft and desirable Orange, whom she does not want to lose, while caring for Marika like a doctor or mother. The exotic and vivid depictions of Bali form an "Orientalist" scenery, accompanied by atmospheric photos and vibrant illustrations of Bali, painted by Hara Masumi. After eating magic mushrooms, Marika is even depicted like a joyful Bodhisattva and, later on, like a Buddhist stone sculpture. Sherif (1999: 288) writes that "in a somewhat Orientalist move, she [Yoshimoto] portrays the mythical process of disintegration, spiritual and psychological wandering, and finally reintegration as all happening on the exoticized South Pacific Island of Bali". Sherif (1999: 279Ϫ299) also quotes a psychologist from Tokyo who stated in an interview that Yoshimoto's writings had a calming effect on his patients and that her novels brought some kind of brightness into their lives.
The iyashi-kei 'healing type' quality of Yoshimoto's texts fit well into the healing boom that began around the time she published her first novels. Her stories feature exotic otherness inspired by journeys and mythical spirituality she encountered. All elements seem to be arranged in a certain way to fit into a society that longs for healing from anxieties, and ways out of "dame Nihon" 'hopeless Japan'. Yoshimoto is still a critic of Japanese society, but the way in which she labels herself and serves the healing boom industry might be one of the reasons why her fame in Western academic circles dropped rapidly. Two other recent novels of Yoshimoto revolve around similar topics. Nankurunai 'What Will Be, Will Be' (2004) contains four short stories set in Okinawa Prefecture. The mood is the same as in Marika no sofā or Bari yume nikki: Dwellers from Tokyo are traveling to an exotic island (in this case Okinawa) and find mythical healing in the local nature and spiritual rituals. The most recent example of Yoshimoto's spirituality is Maboroshi Hawai 'Visions of Hawai' (2010a), a novel about a middleaged woman who travels to Hawai'i with a good friend after her father's death to find healing and relaxation.
Yoshimoto's travel preferences Ϫ semi-tropical islands and other "power spots" Ϫ are recommendations she openly proposes to stressed and "worn out" Japanese women. In an interview for the women's magazine GRAZIA in August 2008 with the title Yoshimoto Banana no kōfukuron, 'Yoshimoto Banana's theory of happiness' (2010b), she names six places promising iyashi: Capri and Mykonos in the Mediterranean Sea, Hawai'i, Seoul, Okinawa, as well as Nara as the only spot in mainland Japan (Gebhardt 2010: Ch. 2) .
Two years after Nankurunai, Yoshimoto published Nankurunaku, nai ('What Will Be, Will Not Be'). Not a sequel but rather reminiscent of the Bari yume nikki, it is a compilation of six "Okinawa diary" entries written between 1999 and 2004, which had previously been published on her Web site and in literature magazines. Also included are private photos taken by Yoshimoto herself, as well as around forty shots taken by photographer Tarumi Kengo (*1948), famous for his visualizations of Okinawa, showing Yoshimoto in various settings, including swimming in the ocean (see Figure 4) or together with a school class in front of the Sēfā utaki.
13 Another asset of the "diary" collection are four pictures (see Figure 5 ) painted by the songwriter and illustrator Hara Masumi (*1955), who traveled together with Yoshimoto to various exotic locations.
One of Hara Masumi's illustrations ( Figure 5 ) shows around fifty noro (priestesses of the Okinawan belief system) of relatively advanced age, dressed in classical ceremonial vestments, standing on a beach with hands folded and chanting prayers. In the middle of the noro, Yoshimoto rides on a donkey (or horse), and another cubist-looking, maybe male figure (behind the noro in the ocean) rides on a Dugong (an endangered species living in the oceans around Okinawa). Four men are carrying a dragon figure, typical of the Hārii dragon boat festival. In the center of the ocean, the waves form a palace, which is an allusion to the dragon palace (ryūgu or nirai kanai) under the sea, 14 where the souls of the deceased go according to the Okinawan belief system. Far in the back to the right, we see the ocean platform of the 1975 International Ocean Exposition and a rainbow of fishes streaming down from one of the clouds. In this picture, Hara was able to amalgamate a multitude of Okinawan stereotypes into a colorful neo-imperial vision of Okinawa. Hara's illustrations in Nankurunaku, nai always relate directly to the contents of each "diary" entry, and by depicting Yoshimoto as a naked and smiling postmodern goddess in the middle of exotic representations of an illusionary paradise, Hara seems to echo exactly what Yoshimoto does in most of her "diary" entries: " [W] hile marveling at the dense beauty of the nature and walking through fields under the burning sun, she [Yoshimoto] thinks about the lost heart of the Japanese people" (Yoshimoto 2006 : book jacket). However, this description appears to understate Yoshimoto's actual opinion on contemporary Japan, as becomes clear in the afterword written in 2006: I think I really like … loved Japan. I am really sad that I have to say this in past tense. In recent years I keep on seeing too many strange things and it saddens me that I already got used to it [i.e., in Tokyo] […] Am I just complaining this much because I already became an old woman? I really don't think so (Yoshimoto 2006: 241) .
However, Nankurunaku, nai is not classic travel literature as, for example, the writing of Ikezawa Natsuki (*1945) (e.g., Ikezawa 1996) . Most of the diary entries are quite trivial and might contain welcome and amusing information for Yoshimoto's audience, such as a comparison between ANA (All Nippon Airlines) and JAL (Japan Airlines) or the following piece of information: "June 22nd, 2003. To Ishigaki Island. The baby didn't cry more than usual. But it had to shit recklessly (unko dashimakuri) while we were in the airplane, and I was a bit embarrassed" (Yoshimoto 2006: 168) .
Nonetheless, Yoshimoto stays true to herself and writes in an everyday mundane manner that could be labeled "stream of consciousness".
The first entry dates back to 1999, written after her first visit to Okinawa, and the millennium seemed to have taken its toll on her writing, since her sentences are infused with both a seikimatsu ('end-of-thecentury') feeling and spirituality, in which she has been interested ever since her first encounters with chōnōryoku-sha ('people capable of extrasensory perception'). In this diary entry on her first-ever trip to Okinawa, Yoshimoto links everything she encounters directly to circumstances in Japan, thus hyper-affirming Okinawa in every possible way. For example, the Okinawan priestess (noro) she meets is linked to the loss of deeply cherished spirituality and tradition in Japan. The thick jungle nature and the beaches become vivid metaphors to contrast the semento no sabaku 'cement desert' of Tokyo and its inhabitants who "seem to be dead" inside, while she ascribes "gentleness" (yasashisa) to Okinawans in general. She even assigns high iyashi value to the exotic, fresh, and self-grown crops that make her think about the alienation from the production process of comestible goods in Japan and how "sad" this estrangement is. Shortly after her return to Tokyo, something extraordinary happens:
Since I came back, I met many people who can see things that normally can't be seen and they said, "There is something behind you with red, flowing hair, a small body and big eyes and it's sticking to you!" Whaaat? What could that be, I thought. When I asked people from Okinawa, they told me that it is a spirit of the forests called Kijimunā […] . What does a Kijimunā think about Tokyo, I thought to myself. Wouldn't he get very nervous and just run away? I wonder why he took a liking in me and came with me, but it makes me feel a bit happy (Yoshimoto 2006: 70) .
Overall, in this travel diary, Yoshimoto repeats and draws on all existing Okinawa-isms to contrast them with mainland Japan in an inverted Nihonjinron discourse or the typical "dame Nihon" ('hopeless Japan') narrative employed by rosu jene ('lost generation') and post-Aum-attack authors who enunciate their disappointment and frustration publically (e.g., Kirino Natsuo or Amamiya Karin [*1975]) .
In her groundbreaking publication Can the Subaltern Speak?, Spivak (2008 Spivak ( [1988 ) argues that members of the ruling class or hegemonic society are unable to speak for the subaltern people, because they are not able to "hear", let alone understand their issues, due to their own cultural framework and hierarchical position over the colonized people they rule. As an example she cites the banning of sati (ritual suicide of a married woman after the death of her husband) in colonial India by the British colonizers, who believed they were doing something positive, but actually never listened to what the sati-attempting spouses themselves had to say. Pointing out that similar power dynamics can also be found in other colonial settings, Spivak (2008 Spivak ( [1988 : 106) concludes that voices of the subaltern or colonized people are not heard as long as colonizers speak for them. Needless to say, Spivak was harshly criticized for her claim, but applying this point of view to Yoshimoto's Nankurunaku, nai reveals the same effect: Yoshimoto speaks only affirmatively about the social conditions and indigenous representations she encounters. She ignores the problems existing on Okinawa and instead interprets everything as examples of how things should ideally be. In fact, Yoshimoto often stages her plots in popular or chic resorts and tourist destinations, indulges in local spiritual customs, and completely overlooks political or social conditions. However, the fundamental difference with Spivak's example is that Okinawa is a Japanese colony and Yoshimoto is a representative of the hegemonic Japanese society that rules the islands. Thus, in this diary, Yoshimoto becomes a powerful "neo-imperial" agent without even noticing it herself. Her ignorance and historical amnesia reflect both her need for healing and her longing for a utopia or spiritually pure and "primitive state" that she misses in mainland Japan. Merging the discourses of the "healing boom" and the Okinawa boom, her writings turn into a written commodity that serves the contemporary needs of a society focused on healing and relaxation.
However, is Yoshimoto's gaze "neo-imperialistic" in general? In her other travel diaries, such as the Bari yume nikki, she does not compare Japan directly to the outbound travel destination. In one of her diary entries from Bali she states that all inhabitants of the village called Tenganan looked like Japanese people (Yoshimoto 1997: 199) and this is the only comparison to Japan in the whole publication. In Nankurunaku, nai, however, she does contrast strongly the nostalgic feeling on Okinawa with mainland Japanese life. While Yoshimoto laments many things that have vanished in mainland Japan Ϫ especially village communities, indigenous spirituality, and family ties Ϫ it seems to her that social and religious values are still intact on Okinawa. She constantly contrasts life on Okinawa with problematic contemporary tendencies in mainland Japanese society, and she even proposes traveling to Okinawa as a means to gain new spiritual strength and a fresh perspective on one's own life course. Yoshimoto's hyper-affirmation of typically "Okinawan" values that obscure historical and contemporary problems, her labeling of Okinawa as the "southern territory of healing" (iyashi no nankoku), and thus her hegemonic position (i.e., as a member of the ruling class) form a conjunction that Ko (2010) would describe as "cosmetic multiculturalism". But it can also be described as a display of neo-imperial agency or as a "gaze" that is "neo-imperial" only unconsciously, blurred by stereotypical visualizations.
Conclusion
As seen in the writings of Yoshimoto and its visual Okinawa-isms, the Okinawa boom is derived from the mainland Japanese "healing boom" (iyashi būmu) as well as other previous booms. The imaginative "good old" Yamato "narrative" (monogatari) ascribed to Okinawa in folklore studies transformed slowly into a mukokuseki ('stateless') "tourist gaze". The next stage was the individualization of the Okinawa image Ϫ in a switch from "nature" and indigenous "culture" to emotional commodities such as "gentleness" (yasashisa) and "comfort" (iyashisa). This was the birth of the Okinawa "narrative" (monogatari) that many people are willing to consume, because it incorporates the important key words of "healing" (iyashi) and "nostalgia" (natsukashisa), and finds in Okinawa all the good things Japan has already lost. Even Okinawan magazines reflect only Okinawa-isms and nurture images of a stereotypical paradise by predominantly focusing on exchangeable visual depictions. Thus, today, Okinawans see themselves through tourist eyes and often reproduce these Okinawa-esque images, a process of "self-okinawanization" that has even resulted in the physical "customization" of the islands (Tada 2008: 152) .
Moreover, it has been shown that mass tourism yields only a very small economic gain for the prefecture. A comparison with Hawai'i, where tourism has had a more significant economic impact, revealed that Okinawa relies heavily on inbound tourism, which makes the industry much more prone to crises (as shown, for example, when the resort and real estate bubble bursted in 2009). Apart from the economic effects, both Hawai'ian and Okinawan representations are reduced to highly exotic stereotypes. The diminution of their cultural, spiritual, and historic traditions in the media creates nothing more than disposable paradise heterotopias that obscure the possibilities for a sustainable and self-constructed identity. However, is shrouding oneself in a postcolonial cloak of ambivalence the only possible answer? As Bhowmik (2008) and Hein (2010) have argued, many answers to this endeavor may be found in Okinawan literature, and Okinawan media today also respond in various ways to the Okinawa-isms presented in the Japanese media. However, many Okinawa-isms are also incorporated in works of Okinawan provenience, although the indigenous perception and implementation of the Okinawa "narrative" mostly demystify these Okinawa-isms. Ko (2010: 91Ϫ113) states the same about Okinawa-related movies by Okinawan directors and movie creators such as Takamine Gō. However, there are neither many contemporary Okinawan celebrities who could act as "postcolonial counter-agents" in Japanese show business Ϫ singer, actor, and songwriter Gackt Ka-mui, for example, who admitted in his autobiography that he had grown up on Okinawa (Gackt 2003 : Ch. 1), might be an exception Ϫ nor are there many critical voices from Okinawa that speak on a political or counter-cultural level heard in mainland Japanese mass media. This is a problem that many colonial minorities worldwide share. Even if a minority is small in number, it never speaks with one voice, a fact that is also represented in a yearly survey conducted by the Ryūkyū Shimpō: only 20.6% of the questioned Okinawans in 2007 thought that Okinawa should be an independent country (Lim 2009: 105Ϫ147) .
The popular teledrama Churasan and its switch from "nature" and "tradition" to "gentleness" and "comfort" can be seen as an important agent in popularizing a "neo-imperial gaze" which is also helpful for the ongoing political debates between Japan and the United States concerning the military facilities on Okinawa, because the Okinawans are transformed to and publicly accepted as passive bystanders. It is unclear whether this agenda was conscious or unconscious, but the persistent repetition of images and their stereotyping effect even on the Okinawans proves the effect of a "neo-imperial gaze".
Certainly, the Okinawans in general do not see themselves as pure victims, as is shown in the survey by Lim (2009) ; the diverse strands of discourse are much more heterogeneous. The media of the Okinawa boom and their highly stereotypical representations of Okinawan culture (or Okinawa-isms) could be sketched only roughly in this paper, since empirical data on this vast corpus of media are still not available.
Furthermore, the subaltern voices of Okinawa, especially those of the Okinawa bungaku ('Okinawan literature') found their way into the Japanese mainland discourse. So far, four Okinawan authors have won the Akutagawa Prize for their depictions of war traumata, indigenous history, and socioeconomic disparities, and new works by novelists such as Ōshiro Tatsuhiro, Medoruma Shun, and Matayoshi Eiki are distributed by renowned Japanese publishing companies including Kōdansha and Shinchōsha. Furthermore, Okinawan filmmakers such as Takamine Gō and their counter-stereotypical narratives have to be considered when the landscape of Okinawan identities is mapped out.
The distribution of stereotyped images via celebrities and the tourism industry is a form of hegemonic (mis)representation, trajectories that can be seen not only concerning Okinawan issues, but also in the context of other Pacific minorities such as the Kanaka Maoli (Hawai'ians) (Wilson 2000: xiϪxix) . Due to this global perspective it is high time that postcolonial issues are also located in a global framework outside of national boundaries and discourses. Obviously, "neo-imperial" agency is not just a process that purely forces erroneous representations on Okinawans or Hawai'ians through US or mainland Japanese tourist companies and lifestyle celebrities. The acceptance or self-reproduction of certain images by indigenous people themselves also fuels this machinery of "neo-imperial" oppression and shows how complex the trajectories of "neo-imperial" agency are.
Numerous antithetic and polarizing aspects of a vital cultural mosaic called "Okinawan identity" have yet to be researched and many discourses surrounding this postcolonial minority can only be understood through further empirical and comparative analysis on the backdrop of a basic understanding for "neo-imperial" agency.
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Notes
1. The term media here is used synonymously with multimedia and contains all media that shape mass communication, including print media (e.g., pamphlets, novels, guide books, and magazines), visual media (e.g., movies, TV series and documentaries), and Internet media (e.g., tourist Web pages, company pages, real estate Web sites, commercials, and advertisements). 2. Uchinā means Okinawa in the Ryūkyūan language. 3. The term "neo-imperial" was chosen to differentiate it from nineteenth-century classical imperialism. The imperial agenda in Okinawa and Hawai'i after WWII is no longer to brutally civilize "savages", but to politically disempower the colonized indigenous minorities and maintain the status quo of social disparity. 4. The terms gaze or gazing refer to "mental perceptions" (Maoz 2005: 222) and are used in the sense of how Pratt (1992) and Urry (1990) defined it: The colonizers are "gazing upon" the subaltern people and their issues, due to their hegemonic power position that places them above the colonized people they rule. Moreover, a contemporary "neo-imperial gaze" differs from a classical "colonial gaze", since visual media and tourist propaganda convey other notions to a public community than travel writing of the nineteenth-century. 5. Furusato literally translates as 'home town' or 'historical village'. In the context of tourism, it refers to rural areas and evokes a feeling of nostalgia (natsukashisa). In that sense, it represents the opposite of urban spaces, which are connoted with hectic pace and unrest. 6. For a detailed list of media that appeared during the iyashi 'healing' boom, see Roquet (2009: 88) . 7. The imperial Japanese agenda in the Meiji-and Taishō era was to transform the "uncivilized" Okinawans to worthy members of the Japanese empire. Old traditions were to be preserved, but school curricula were changed, speaking
Ryūkyūan was forbidden and disciplined, the typical hand tattoos of women (called hajichi) were prohibited, and an unfair poll-tax was collected. For additional details, see Smits (2004) . 8. Many Okinawans migrated to South America, Hawai'i, or Taiwan in the Meiji and Taishō eras due to colonial discrimination and severe economic circumstances. For additional details, see Ueunten (2008) . 9. All data on Hawai'i in this passage had been taken from the official Web site of the State of Hawai'i (2011). 10. All data on the United States and Hawai'i in this paragraph can be found at the Web site of the US Census Bureau (2011). All data on Japan are quoted from E-stat (2010). 11. In this uprising, the inhabitants of Okinawa revolted against the occupational rule of the United States, demanding the demilitarization of the islands and the reversion of Okinawa. For additional information, see Ueunten (2010) . 12. "Simulacrum" is understood in the wake of Jean Baudrillard, according to his concept of "simulacra" or hyper-reality created by postmodern mass media. 13. According to the Okinawan belief system, an utaki is a place where gods reside.
The oldest utaki are natural holy sites such as big trees, rocks, cliffs, and caves. Man-made utaki also exist. 14. Nirai kanai is a mythical place from which all life originates. It is worshiped facing westward and commonly believed to be an island, from where the gods brought different crops and tools to mankind. However, Nirai kanai or Girai Kanai can also refer to the underwater realm of the Dragon or Sea King.
